Syria’s interim constitution was signed by interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa in Damascus on March 13, 2025, following a visit from a Turkish delegation that included Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, National Defense Minister Yasar Guler, and the head of the National Intelligence Organization, Ibrahim Kalin. This constitution appears to be a foundational step toward rebuilding the country after years of devastating conflict. However, a closer examination reveals that it is a complex geopolitical maneuver influenced by factors that extend beyond Syria’s borders, ultimately serving Israeli objectives within the broader context of the greater Israel project.
Firstly, the constitutional declaration bears striking similarities to Turkey’s 2017 constitutional amendments, which transitioned the country from a parliamentary to a powerful presidential system, abolishing the Prime Minister’s role and substantially centralizing executive power. Similarly, Syria’s new interim constitution eliminates the prime ministerial position, consolidating executive power exclusively in President al-Sharaa’s hands. Both constitutions provide the presidents with the authority to issue emergency decrees, effectively allowing them to rule without parliamentary oversight under certain conditions. Additionally, both constitutional frameworks grant extensive presidential authority over the appointment of ministers and judges, further reinforcing centralized control. This convergence strongly suggests Turkish influence, consistent with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s long-standing support for Islamist factions within Syria.
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has long positioned himself publicly as a defender of Muslim unity and the Palestinian cause. Paradoxically, however, Turkey’s actions in Syria have consistently supported destabilization and fragmentation, aligning indirectly with Israeli strategic interests. Erdoğan’s policy shift from rhetoric opposing Israel to actions that deliberately serve Israeli goals has been particularly evident in Turkey’s Syria policy.
In the early 2000s, Erdoğan sought closer ties with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, strengthening economic and diplomatic relations. However, when the Arab Spring erupted in 2011, Turkey swiftly shifted its position, becoming one of the leading supporters of armed opposition groups seeking to overthrow Assad. Many of these groups, including jihadist factions, played a key role in destabilizing Syria, plunging the country into a prolonged civil war.
This instability has served Israel’s strategic interests by preventing Syria from functioning as a cohesive state capable of resisting Israeli military actions and supporting regional allies such as Hezbollah. Turkey’s military interventions in northern Syria, under the pretext of securing its borders and countering Kurdish groups, have further fragmented the country. Turkey’s deeper involvement in the north has also become a convenient argument for Israel’s aggressive security posture in the south. By maintaining a Turkish-controlled zone in northern Syria, Erdoğan has ensured that Assad remains unable to fully reassert control over his territory, keeping Syria weak and divided. This controlled instability also resonates with Israel’s preference for a weakened and divided Syria.
In line with this strategy, the toppling of Bashar al-Assad was facilitated and organized by Turkey, the United States, and Israel, driven by geopolitical considerations. With Donald Trump’s return to the U.S. presidency and a potential resolution of the Ukraine conflict leading to strengthened ties between Russia and Assad, Western powers anticipated an empowered Assad government supported by a stronger Russian presence. To preempt this, these actors orchestrated Assad’s removal to maintain Syria in a weakened, fragmented state.
Critics have frequently pointed to Erdoğan’s participation as co-chair in the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative (BMENA), a U.S.-supported initiative ostensibly aimed at democratization but criticized for exacerbating regional instability and facilitating regime change. Rather than fostering genuine political reform, BMENA has historically maintained controlled instability that is beneficial to Israeli strategic objectives, and Erdoğan’s role in this project underscores his alignment with these broader geopolitical interests.
Moreover, despite the interim constitution’s assurances of freedoms and protections for minorities, real-world reactions reveal significant dissatisfaction and fear of marginalization. The Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Council (SDC) explicitly rejected the constitution, describing it as authoritarian and lacking inclusivity. Demonstrators in Kurdish-majority cities like Amuda protested, demanding recognition of Syria’s diversity and rejecting top-down governance structures imposed from Damascus.
Further, a dozen Yazidi associations and unions strongly rejected the interim constitution, citing its failure to uphold Syria’s obligations under international human rights standards such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Yazidi representatives criticized the constitution for sidelining religious minorities and retaining Islamic jurisprudence as the main legislative source, raising fears of continued marginalization and persecution—issues particularly sensitive given the Yazidi community’s devastating experiences under ISIS in neighboring Iraq. Likewise, the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (DAANES), governing Kurdish-majority regions, warned that the document threatens their autonomy and could erode their established cultural and linguistic freedoms.
Similarly, the Druze community has expressed heightened concern about their future under the new governance structure, particularly in light of increasing interactions with Israel and concerns over preserving autonomy and identity.
United Nations special envoy Geir Pedersen emphasized the critical importance of inclusivity, calling for an investigation into recent sectarian violence that has shaken confidence in Syria’s transitional governance. These international concerns reflect growing anxieties over the constitution’s potential to deepen rather than resolve Syria’s divisions.
In conclusion, Syria’s interim constitution, signed in Damascus but influenced significantly by Ankara, aligns with broader Israeli objectives. Erdoğan’s calculated duality of rhetoric and action underlines a geopolitical strategy that perpetuates instability beneficial to Israel by maintaining Syria as a fragmented and weakened state. Thus, Syria’s constitutional transition risks exacerbating existing divisions rather than resolving them.
By News About Turkey (NAT)
