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The Evolution of Turkey’s Kurdish Opening: From Turgut Özal to the Present

Turkey's Kurdish opening, a series of measures launched by the state in recent decades to address the Kurdish question, has its roots in the political and economic reforms initiated by Turgut Özal. As Turkey's eighth president (1989–1993) and a key architect of its modernization, Özal played a transformative role in shifting official policy from repression to a cautious acknowledgment of Kurdish identity. Over the decades, the Kurdish opening has seen moments of progress and setbacks. However, the issue has taken on a new regional and global dimension following the ousting of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, challenging Turkey's domestic policies and cross-border Kurdish strategies. Turgut Özal and the Foundations of the Kurdish Opening Turgut Özal was the first Turkish leader to publicly recognize the existence of a "Kurdish issue," moving beyond the conventional security-focused approach of the state. Privately, he advocated for lifting restrictions on the Kurdish language and identity, even supporting the use of Kurdish terms in informal settings. Under his leadership, Turkey took initial steps toward loosening strict assimilationist policies, allowing limited Kurdish broadcasting and cultural expressions. Beyond domestic reforms, Özal also sought diplomatic engagement with Iraqi Kurdish leaders, including Jalal Talabani and Masoud Barzani. This marked a departure from Turkey's traditional containment strategy, as Özal promoted dialogue rather than repression. His most significant peace initiative came in 1992 when he launched backchannel negotiations with Abdullah Öcalan, leader of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). These efforts led to the PKK's first unilateral ceasefire. However, Özal's sudden death in April 1993 led to a resurgence of military operations, effectively ending peace efforts. Many argue that Özal was assassinated because of his ambition to resolve the Kurdish question, as his Kurdish Opening policy upset both regional and international actors who opposed a peaceful solution to the issue. His death, under suspicious circumstances, has fueled speculation that powerful interests sought to prevent a lasting resolution to the Kurdish problem and his regional ambitions. The 1990s: Military Escalation and Regional Challenges Following Özal's death, the state resumed heavy-handed counterinsurgency tactics, deepening the divide between the Turkish government and the Kurdish population. However, this approach faced significant structural challenges. The PKK's armed campaign intensified, proving that a purely military solution was untenable. The decade saw an unprecedented rise in violence, with forced displacements, village evacuations, and extrajudicial killings becoming widespread. Meanwhile, regional developments further complicated Turkey's position. The 1991 Gulf War and subsequent U.S. intervention in Iraq led to the establishment of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). This weakened Turkey's ability to contain cross-border Kurdish movements, as northern Iraq became a de facto autonomous Kurdish region. Concurrently, Turkey's bid for European Union (EU) membership in 1999 brought new pressures for democratic reforms. The EU's requirements pushed Turkey toward human rights improvements, including the abolition of the death penalty in 2002, which spared Öcalan from execution. Restrictions on Kurdish-language broadcasting and education were also relaxed, setting the stage for a more structured Kurdish opening under the Justice and Development Party (AKP). .The AKP’s Kurdish Opening (2002–2009) When the AKP came to power in 2002, it initially downplayed the Kurdish issue, prioritizing EU-driven democratization. However, a combination of domestic and international pressures pushed the government toward direct engagement. A pivotal moment came in 2005 when Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan delivered a speech in Diyarbakır, in which he openly acknowledged state mistakes regarding the Kurdish issue and promised more democracy, citizenship rights, and economic prosperity for the region. While this speech was groundbreaking, it was not immediately followed by concrete policy changes. The turning point in the Kurdish Opening came in 2007 when the National Security Council (MGK) formally decided to engage in dialogue with the PKK. Secret talks between Turkish intelligence (MIT) and PKK representatives commenced, marking a significant departure from previous state policies. By 2009, the Kurdish Opening was formally launched, leading to the establishment of TRT 6, Turkey’s first state-run Kurdish-language television channel. Additionally, university Kurdish language departments were introduced, and the PKK declared a ceasefire in May 2009. Despite these advances, the nationalist backlash against the return of PKK members via the Habur border crossing in 2009 led to a slowing down of the process, as public sentiment became more polarized. The 2013–2015 Peace Process: A Missed Historic Opportunity By 2013, both the state and PKK recognized that military solutions had reached a deadlock, prompting a renewed peace initiative. Abdullah Öcalan played a central role in this process, with his historic Newroz declaration in March 2013 calling for an end to armed conflict and for Kurdish rights to be secured through political means. In response, the PKK began withdrawing its fighters, and negotiations between the government and Kurdish representatives intensified. However, despite the initial momentum, the peace process lacked sufficient institutional guarantees, and when violent incidents, such as the assassination of two Turkish police officers in Ceylanpınar and the ISIS bombing of Kurdish activists in Suruç, occurred in 2015, trust between the parties collapsed. In addition, the 2011 Syrian Civil War introduced a major geopolitical challenge for Turkey’s Kurdish policy. The emergence of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES), commonly known as Rojava, significantly altered Turkey’s security calculations. Ankara viewed the People’s Protection Units (YPG), the armed wing of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), as an extension of the PKK, complicating ongoing peace talks. Turkey launched multiple military operations in Syria, including Operation Euphrates Shield (2016), Operation Olive Branch (2018), and Operation Peace Spring (2019), aimed at curbing Kurdish autonomy in northern Syria. The collapse of the peace process between 2013 and 2015 echoed the failed attempts at reconciliation during Turgut Özal’s presidency. Just as Özal had sought a political resolution in 1993, only for his sudden death and subsequent hardline policies to derail progress, the post-2015 environment saw a return to militarized approaches. One of the key similarities between both periods was the opposition of powerful Western states to a negotiated resolution of the Kurdish conflict. While public discourse often framed these states as supporters of peace,…