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The Gülenist Diaspora and A “Calvinist” Turn in Islam

In Turkey, an odd unanimity has settled in: from Erdoğanists to segments of the secular left, people speak about the Gülen movement through the language of crime—but rarely through the language of punishment. The accusation may change in tone (“terror,” “infiltration,” “cult,” “parallel state”), yet the deeper consensus holds: whatever happened, the collective penalties that followed are treated as self-explanatory—asset seizures, mass professional bans and purges, institutional liquidations, and a social “curse” that spreads far beyond any court verdict. What’s missing is the uncomfortable question a society asks when it is still inside the rule-of-law horizon: Even if you believe guilt exists—what kind of punishment is legitimate, and against whom? That moral blind spot matters, because it’s precisely the kind of blind spot that—historically—has produced something else: a disciplined, economically adaptive, institution-building religious diaspora that eventually looks less like the caricature its persecutors created and more like an unexpected reform current. In this regard, what is emerging among Gülenists in the West is a Calvinist moment inside contemporary Islam: not a theological conversion to Protestant doctrine, obviously, but a diaspora-driven reformation of practice—work ethic, sobriety, civic integration, institutional durability, and (crucially) a shift from leader-centered loyalty toward principle-and-rule-centered survival. The analogy is not ours alone. Long before the 2016 rupture, researchers were already describing a “Protestant work ethic” dynamic among pious Turkish business circles—so much so that a well-known report popularized the label “Islamic Calvinists,” capturing the blend of religiosity, discipline, and market success in Anatolia. What changed after 2016 is that the Gülen movement—once deeply entangled in Turkey’s power struggles—was thrown into exile en masse, and exile has a way of forcing movements to choose: either become a permanently resentful sect, or learn to live by institutions, law, and long-term civic credibility. Defining “Calvinist Islamism” At its core, Calvinist Islamism is a conceptual framework describing Islamist activism that mirrors the qualities Max Weber attributed to ascetic Protestantism: diligence, discipline, and worldly engagement in service of faith. Rather than revolutionary zeal or personality cults, these Islamist actors emphasize education, entrepreneurship, and community institutions – much like Calvinists valued schools, guilds, and self-governing congregations. Analysts have in fact dubbed some of Turkey’s pious entrepreneurs and community-builders “Islamic Calvinists,” noting their own frequent attribution of success to a “Protestant ethic.” In the mid-2000s, for example, researchers observed a “quiet Islamic reformation” among Anatolian Muslim entrepreneurs and titled their study “Islamic Calvinists,” highlighting the fusion of Islamic values with practical rationality in free-market enterprise. A number of these “Islamic Calvinists” were followers of Turkish preacher Fethullah Gülen, whose movement became renowned for business success and funding of schools. In other words, long before the term “Calvinist Islamism” was coined, the hallmarks of the idea were visible: devout Muslims coupling hard work, frugality, and education with religious purpose – an Islamic analogue to the Calvinist work ethic that even critics acknowledge. Equally important is the mode of leadership and authority in such movements. Principle-based leadership – grounded in doctrinal values and institutional norms – takes precedence over charismatic authority. This contrasts with more personality-driven Islamist currents led by singular figures or firebrands. In “Calvinist Islamist” circles, the legitimacy of leaders flows from their ability to embody and implement shared principles (such as service, honesty, or consultative decision-making) rather than populist charisma. For instance, Fethullah Gülen himself has been described as a pragmatic, principle-focused leader who “provides inspiration, motivation, vision, and overarching principles” to his followers, without an overt cult of personality or formal hierarchy. Observers like scholar Hakan Yavuz have even likened Gülen’s ideas to Calvinism in their encouragement of neoliberal entrepreneurship and self-discipline. The broader pattern is that these movements seek to routinize their values into durable institutions (schools, charities, civic organizations) which outlast any one leader. Authority is often decentralized or exercised through boards and councils, echoing how Calvinist churches were governed by elders and presbyteries rather than by bishops or singular holy men. Gülen Movement in Western Diasporas After 2016 The 2016 coup attempt in Turkey and its aftermath set the stage for a dramatic manifestation of this trend. The Turkish government’s purge of the suspected orchestrators – primarily the Gülen movement (dubbed FETÖ by Ankara) – led to the mass exile of tens of thousands of Gülen-affiliated individuals. In both cases—French Calvinists (Huguenots) and the Gülen movement—opponents built a politically powerful narrative of “office capture”: the idea that a tightly knit religious network quietly promotes its own members, protects insiders, and turns state institutions into an extension of the community. In early modern France, this suspicion attached itself to Huguenot organizational cohesion—synods, assemblies, and dense patronage ties—and critics often portrayed Protestants as a “state within a state,” implying that any Protestant presence in sensitive offices would translate into confessional favoritism. Even where Protestants served the crown in ordinary ways, their solidarity could be reinterpreted as illicit factionalism: a claim that “they look after their own” and bend justice or administration toward co-religionists rather than the crown’s neutral order. The modern version of the same accusation was directed at the Gülen movement in Turkey, but expressed in bureaucratic language: cadre-placement in the police, judiciary, and military; preferential recruitment through recommendation chains; and, at the most extreme end of the allegation spectrum, the claim that “meritocratic” pathways (exams, promotions) were manipulated to create a pipeline for insiders. In both the French and Turkish cases, the sociological mechanism is similar: ordinary network effects—trust, shared schooling, mutual assistance—become politically reframed as “infiltration,” which then helps justify exceptional countermeasures against not only individuals but an entire community. Stripped of their influence at home, these displaced Islamically-inspired actors began to reorganize and adapt within Western societies. By 2019, analysts noted that “a Gülenist diaspora is in the making” as many followers fled to Europe and North America, seeking the rule of law and safety of liberal democracies. Crucially, the Gülen movement in exile has doubled down on its long-standing ethos of education, interfaith dialogue, and lawful civic engagement, rather than agitating for any violent or…