Some ‘analysts’ argue that President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s recent move to detain Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu might inadvertently elevate İmamoğlu’s political standing—drawing comparisons to Erdoğan’s own imprisonment in 1999. However, such comparisons fail to acknowledge the significant transformations in Turkey’s political landscape and the contrasting ideological foundations of the two leaders.
Erdoğan’s 1999 Imprisonment and Its Impact
In 1999, Erdoğan, then serving as the mayor of Istanbul, was sentenced to prison for reciting a poem that authorities deemed to incite religious hatred. Many perceived this conviction as an attempt by Turkey’s secular establishment to suppress the growing Islamist movement. His imprisonment triggered widespread public sympathy, positioning him as a victim of state repression. This event became a turning point in Turkish politics, propelling the rise of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), which capitalized on widespread frustration with the secular elite. Erdoğan’s deep ties to the Islamist Milli Görüş movement provided him with a dedicated ideological base and an organized political network that played a crucial role in his later success. Additionally, Erdoğan and his conservative supporters viewed the secular state as a monolithic entity oppressing their movement, which helped them galvanize support and portray their struggle as a broader fight against an entrenched elite.
İmamoğlu’s Arrest in a Changed Political Landscape
In contrast, İmamoğlu’s recent arrest on charges of corruption and alleged links to terrorist organizations occurs in a Turkey where Erdoğan has amassed considerable power over two decades. Under Erdoğan’s leadership, key democratic institutions have been systematically weakened, and political dissent has been met with increasing suppression. Unlike Erdoğan, İmamoğlu lacks a rigid ideological movement like Milli Görüş to support him. His base is diverse, comprising secularists, liberals, and moderate conservatives, which, while broad, does not possess the same ideological unity or mobilization capacity that benefited Erdoğan in the past. Furthermore, Erdoğan’s long-term political ambition is to rule Turkey indefinitely and eventually transfer power to his son, Bilal Erdoğan. This creates a scenario where political rivals like İmamoğlu could face prolonged imprisonment, potentially lasting years or even decades, as a means to eliminate any significant opposition to Erdoğan’s dynastic aspirations. Unlike Erdoğan, who faced the state as an institutional threat, İmamoğlu’s struggle is more personal—he is directly challenging Erdoğan himself, making his position even more precarious in a political environment where power is heavily centralized around one individual.
Furthermore, unlike Erdoğan, who in his early political career fought for the rights of all citizens, regardless of their faith, gender, sexual orientation, or ethnicity, İmamoğlu has not shown the same level of inclusivity. In particular, his silence on the rights of Kurds and Gulenists, who have been persecuted after the 2016 attempted coup, contrasts sharply with Erdoğan’s earlier calls for inclusivity.
This failure to reach out to marginalized groups limits İmamoğlu’s ability to build a political movement as strong as Erdoğan’s.
The Role of Media and Public Perception
During Erdoğan’s rise to power, Turkey’s media environment was relatively pluralistic, enabling different political narratives to reach the public. Today, however, media outlets are largely controlled or influenced by the state, restricting the opposition’s ability to frame İmamoğlu’s arrest as an unjust political persecution. This control over media narratives makes it far more difficult for İmamoğlu to gain widespread public sympathy in the way Erdoğan did in 1999.
Economic Conditions and Political Strategy
The late 1990s were marked by severe economic instability, which the AKP successfully addressed, further boosting Erdoğan’s popularity. Although Turkey currently faces economic difficulties, the government often attributes these issues to external forces, a message reinforced by the pro-government media. This controlled narrative limits İmamoğlu’s ability to rally widespread support based on economic grievances, unlike Erdoğan, who was able to position himself as the solution to Turkey’s financial struggles at the time.
Conclusion
Drawing direct comparisons between Erdoğan’s imprisonment in 1999 and İmamoğlu’s current legal troubles oversimplifies the complexities of Turkey’s changing political environment. The centralization of power, the weakening of democratic institutions, media control, and İmamoğlu’s lack of a cohesive ideological movement all suggest that his arrest is unlikely to trigger the same wave of public sympathy that Erdoğan experienced. Additionally, Erdoğan’s long-term strategy of maintaining power and securing a political future for his family increases the likelihood that opposition figures like İmamoğlu could remain imprisoned for extended periods. Unlike Erdoğan, who positioned himself as a leader fighting an entrenched state structure, İmamoğlu directly threatens Erdoğan as an individual, making his political survival even more uncertain. As a result, the expectation that İmamoğlu’s detention and subsequent imprisonment will ultimately strengthen his political standing against Erdoğan does not fully consider the substantial differences between the two eras and the individuals involved.
By: News About Turkey (NAT)
