The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) has long been intertwined with the legacy of its founder and ideological leader, Abdullah Öcalan. Even after more than two decades in prison, Öcalan’s symbolic authority within the movement remains profound to some extent. But the idea that no major decisions—especially about disarmament or organizational direction—can be made without his physical or online participation doesn’t hold up to scrutiny.
That view, recently restated by senior PKK figure Duran Kalkan, may reflect a deep sense of ‘loyalty’ and ‘respect’. But it also distorts the group’s actual history. Since Öcalan’s capture in 1999, the PKK has repeatedly shown it can act without him—sometimes in ways that even diverge from his own preferences.
So if the organization has the tools, precedent, and leadership to make decisions independently, what’s really preventing it from holding a congress or reconsidering its strategy? The answer lies not in Öcalan’s absence, but in three deeper forces: internal resistance within the PKK, external actors that benefit from the group’s continued existence and the political ambitions of its leadership.
Leadership Isn’t the Problem—Internal Divisions Are
The PKK is structured to function independently, even without Öcalan’s direct leadership. The organization operates under a hierarchical yet collective leadership model based in Kandil.
Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK)—the PKK’s umbrella organization, overseeing its military and political branches and led by figures such as Cemil Bayık, Murat Karayılan and Duran Kalkan—has the authority to convene a congress when necessary, proving that decision-making is not solely dependent on Öcalan’s input.
Recent remarks from those figures illustrate the internal complexities within the organization. Speaking on Sterk TV, Murat Karayılan, a senior PKK commander and member of its Executive Council, addressed Abdullah Öcalan’s February 27 call for a “Congress for Peace and Democratic Society,” acknowledging its significance—but also emphasizing the limitations of what can be achieved without Öcalan’s direct participation.
“Decisions like convening a congress, dissolving the party, or laying down arms are not routine matters,” Karayılan said. “Only Leader Apo, the founder of this movement and the figure everyone looks to, can bring such a process to a conclusion. We say this to ensure that no group is left out and everyone can be persuaded.”
He also acknowledged that there are still members and commanders who are not yet convinced, despite broader organizational discussions. While some outside observers see the emphasis on Öcalan as a political condition or negotiation tactic, Karayılan framed it differently:
“This isn’t about placing demands. It’s a necessity to get the wheels moving. Leader Apo must be able to actively participate—he must be free.”
Following Öcalan’s February 27, 2024, call for a PKK congress, Cemil Bayık emphasized that the decision to hold a congress depends on external conditions, particularly the security situation in the region, not on Öcalan’s physical presence. On March 13, 2024, Bayık stated:
“Everyone knows that under these conditions, convening a congress is impossible and dangerous. If conditions are ensured, the congress will convene and make those decisions.”
The PKK has built a collective leadership structure that’s very much alive and active. Its political and military affairs are managed by the Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK), and leaders like Cemil Bayık, Murat Karayilan and Duran Kalkan hold real authority. This isn’t a movement frozen in time waiting for instructions from prison.
But it’s also not a monolith. When Kalkan recently said, “No one can make the PKK lay down arms or decide on its dissolution at a congress in which Leader Apo does not directly participate or guide,” he wasn’t just invoking loyalty to Öcalan. He was signaling something more complicated: that there is deep skepticism within the organization toward any move that looks like surrender—regardless of who proposes it.
We’ve seen this before. During the 2013–2015 peace process between the Turkish government and Öcalan, some PKK commanders—particularly those based in the Qandil Mountains—were never fully on board. Their doubts helped derail a process Öcalan clearly wanted to pursue.
In that sense, even if Öcalan were released tomorrow, his influence wouldn’t be enough to overcome the resistance within the organization to certain paths—especially disarmament or dissolution.
The PKK Has Acted Without Öcalan—Many Times
The idea that Öcalan is indispensable to PKK decision-making also ignores the record. Since 1999, the PKK has taken several major steps without his direct involvement:
- – 1999: After Öcalan’s arrest, the PKK declared a unilateral ceasefire and withdrew fighters from Turkey—on its own initiative.
- – 2002: It dissolved itself and rebranded as KADEK, attempting a shift from insurgency to political activity.
- – 2003: KADEK disbanded to form a new party structure with a more democratic outlook.
- – 2004: Against Öcalan’s calls for continued dialogue, the PKK resumed armed conflict.
- – 2013–2015: Even as Öcalan negotiated peace, some leaders resisted and ultimately contributed to the collapse of talks.
Each of these moments shows that the PKK doesn’t need Öcalan’s direct guidance to act—whether it’s rebranding, restructuring, or reigniting armed struggle. It chooses its direction based on strategic calculations, not just his wishes.
Outside Actors Aren’t Innocent Bystanders
If internal resistance is one reason the PKK isn’t moving toward a congress or disarmament, external dynamics are another.
The PKK doesn’t operate in a vacuum. Regional and international actors—some of whom publicly condemn terrorism—have found ways to use the PKK and its affiliates for their own ends.
- – In Syria, the U.S. and others have worked with PKK-linked groups like the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in the fight against ISIS. This created a strange paradox: while condemning the PKK in one arena, Western powers were effectively cooperating with its offshoots in another.
- – Regionally, some states, Israel in particular, quietly see the PKK as a tool to apply pressure on Turkey, or as leverage in the broader Kurdish question.
- – In Turkey, the government has used the PKK’s continued presence as justification for military interventions in northern Iraq and Syria, and as a powerful narrative tool in domestic politics.
All of this contributes to a strategic environment where many actors, for very different reasons, have no real interest in seeing the PKK dissolve.
A Strategic Shift Toward Legal Political Participation
Beyond external actors and internal dynamics, there’s another factor that helps explain the recent positioning of senior PKK figures like Karayılan, Bayık, and Kalkan: a growing desire to transition from insurgency to formal political engagement—particularly through the DEM Party, which represents the Kurdish legal political movement in Turkey.
Over the past several years, all three figures have made increasingly political, media-savvy public statements, advocating for negotiation, peace, and recognition of Kurdish identity. These aren’t just rhetorical shifts. They reflect a long-term strategy aimed at opening the door for their own reintegration into political life—should conditions permit.
Their repeated emphasis on Abdullah Öcalan’s involvement can also be seen as a legitimizing strategy: if Öcalan endorses a process, and if they are seen as implementing his vision, they position themselves not as warlords or commanders, but as political actors loyal to a broader cause. This framing could help facilitate their entry into legal politics, particularly if there’s ever a formal peace process.
Karayılan, Bayık, and Kalkan envision a future in which they are no longer in the mountains, but part of a post-conflict political settlement, possibly through a reformed or expanded role in the DEM Party. While that future is far from certain, their language suggests they are preparing the ideological and rhetorical groundwork for such a possibility.
Technology Makes a Congress Possible—Even From Prison
Some argue that a congress cannot happen because Öcalan can’t be physically present. But in 2025, this is hardly a serious barrier. Secure digital communication platforms make it entirely feasible for dispersed leadership to coordinate—even under restrictive conditions.
Resistance movements, governments-in-exile, and underground political networks around the world have adapted to remote decision-making. If needed, Öcalan could even participate virtually from İmralı Prison under tightly monitored conditions.
So while logistical challenges exist, they’re not insurmountable. The real barriers are political and strategic—not technical or procedural.
Conclusion: Leadership Is Symbolic, Strategy Is What Counts
Abdullah Öcalan remains an important symbol for the PKK, and his name still resonates across its supporter base. But history shows that his presence is not required for the organization to act. The real decisions—especially on war and peace—have long been made by those outside his prison cell.
What’s becoming increasingly clear is that leaders like Karayılan, Bayık, and Kalkan are not only interested in prolonging the struggle—they are also positioning themselves for a post-conflict political role. Their consistent emphasis on peace, negotiation, and Öcalan’s centrality can be seen as a strategic narrative designed to facilitate a future transition into formal politics, possibly through the DEM Party.
But that pathway is fraught with complexity. On one side, they must maintain legitimacy among fighters and hardliners within the organization. On the other, they are navigating a regional landscape filled with external powers—some of which have no interest in the PKK’s peaceful transformation.
If the PKK has not convened a congress or taken serious steps toward disarmament, it’s not because Öcalan is absent. It’s because internal resistance, external geopolitics and the political ambitions of its leaders have made those choices unattractive—or even impossible.
Ultimately, the future of the PKK will be shaped by strategy, not symbolism. Its leadership in Qandil has both the authority and the tools to decide its path. Whether they choose to pursue peace, rebrand the movement, or continue their armed struggle will depend not on Öcalan’s participation, but on how they interpret the political conditions they face.
By: News About Turkey (NAT)
