President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan appears to be laying the groundwork for an unprecedented consolidation of power in Turkey – one that not only cements his rule as a full autocracy but also paves the way for a dynastic succession through his son, Bilal Erdoğan. By deliberately engineering political crises and targeting key opposition figures, Erdoğan is creating conditions reminiscent of the post–July 15, 2016 coup attempt environment. The current campaign against Istanbul’s opposition mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu is a striking example of this strategy. It suggests that Erdoğan is manufacturing a sense of national emergency and chaos as a pretext to justify harsher authoritarian measures. In doing so, he aims to eliminate any challengers, reshape the political order to his advantage, and ultimately position his own family to inherit the reins of power.
The Post–July 15 Precedent
The failed coup attempt of July 15, 2016, serves as the foundational precedent for Erdoğan’s current strategy. In the aftermath of that night, Turkey was plunged into a state of emergency that lasted two years, during which Erdoğan’s government carried out massive purges and arrests across the military, judiciary, civil service, academia, and media. This period was characterized by an atmosphere of crisis and siege mentality – one that Erdoğan expertly exploited to rally support and silence opponents. By framing the country as under existential threat, he justified extraordinary measures that effectively dismantled checks and balances. Tens of thousands of citizens were detained or dismissed from their jobs on accusations of supporting the coup plotters or terrorism, often with scant evidence. Critical media outlets were shut down and opposition voices were intimidated or jailed.
Politically, the post–July 15 crackdown allowed Erdoğan to push through fundamental changes to Turkey’s governance. In 2017, amid the fervor of crisis, he narrowly won a constitutional referendum that transformed Turkey from a parliamentary system into a presidential one, greatly expanding his powers. The new executive presidency concentrated authority in Erdoğan’s hands to an unprecedented degree. Many observers noted that the coup attempt had become, in Erdoğan’s own words, a “gift from God” – an opportunity to reshape the state in his image. It set the template for using a national crisis to fast-track autocratic ambitions. Erdoğan emerged from the post-2016 purges stronger than ever, having neutered institutional opposition and fostered a climate of fear that discouraged dissent. This historical episode demonstrated the effectiveness of a manufactured or exaggerated emergency in legitimizing autocratic rule. It is the playbook that Erdoğan appears intent on repeating to secure his reign indefinitely, this time using more calculated political maneuvers rather than an outright military coup attempt.
The İmamoğlu Case: A Manufactured Crisis
If the 2016 coup attempt was a crisis of opportunity for Erdoğan, the ongoing persecution of Ekrem İmamoğlu is a crisis very much by design. İmamoğlu, the popular mayor of Istanbul and a leading figure in the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP), represents the most significant political threat to Erdoğan’s continued dominance. His stunning victory in the 2019 Istanbul mayoral election – winning in a re-run after Erdoğan’s party forced an annulment of the initial vote – and his re-election last year was a major blow to the ruling establishment. Rather than accept this democratic setback, Erdoğan’s regime set out to neutralize İmamoğlu through legal and administrative machinations, effectively manufacturing a political crisis around him.
The campaign against İmamoğlu has unfolded in a deliberate sequence of actions. In late 2022, a Turkish court convicted İmamoğlu on charges of “insulting” members of the High Election Council – essentially for a remark he made criticizing officials who annulled the 2019 mayoral vote. He was sentenced to two years and seven months in prison and given a political ban, a verdict widely condemned as politically motivated. İmamoğlu appealed the sentence, which allowed him to remain in office pending the outcome. However, this was only the beginning. Over the next year, authorities opened a flurry of investigations aimed at undermining the mayor. He was accused of things ranging from improperly influencing judicial proceedings to corruption in municipal tenders. Each investigation seemed designed to tarnish İmamoğlu’s reputation and build a pretext to remove him.
By launching parallel legal tracks, the regime ensures that even if one avenue fails (e.g., the diploma case gets challenged in court or overturned), others are in place to block İmamoğlu’s candidacy or even remove him from public life entirely. This legalistic onslaught is part of Erdoğan’s broader autocratic consolidation. It’s not just about neutralizing İmamoğlu—it’s about sending a message to other rising opposition figures: you can be removed by decree, lawsuit, or court order at any time.
By early 2025, the offensive against the Istanbul mayor escalated dramatically. On March 18, Istanbul University – under pressure from government-aligned officials – announced the annulment of Ekrem İmamoğlu’s university diploma, citing alleged irregularities in how he transferred universities as a student in the 1990s. This startling move was far from a routine academic matter; it carried immense political implications. Under Turkish law, holding a university degree is a requirement for running for president. Stripping İmamoğlu of his diploma was a naked attempt to bar him from challenging Erdoğan in any future presidential race. The timing was telling as well: it came just as opposition circles were discussing İmamoğlu as a potential candidate to lead a united front in the next elections. The mayor decried the diploma cancellation as unlawful and vowed to fight it in court, but the message from the regime was clear – no measure was off-limits in sidelining him.
Immediately after the diploma incident, events took an even more dramatic turn. İmamoğlu was detained by police in a sweeping dawn operation on March 19, 2025, on allegations of corruption and ties to terrorism. Around a hundred people, including municipal staff and associates, were rounded up in this probe. And he is likely to be imprisoned and spend a long time in prison, just like Selahattin Demirtaş.
The state-run media portrayed the arrests as a legitimate corruption crackdown, but to the opposition and any impartial observers, it was evident that this was a politically orchestrated purge. İmamoğlu’s detention – effectively an arrest of an elected official on spurious charges – sent shockwaves through the country. The CHP denounced it as a “coup” against the will of Istanbul’s voters. Protests broke out despite heavy police presence and roadblocks. In one fell swoop, Erdoğan’s government had moved from harassing İmamoğlu through courts to physically removing him from the scene. This manufactured crisis around the İmamoğlu case has all the ingredients needed to justify an authoritarian clampdown: a prominent enemy within, allegations of subversion and threat to the state, and a heightened sense of instability in the political sphere. Erdoğan is banking on the turbulence of this engineered showdown to rally his base, distract from economic woes, and paint the opposition as agents of chaos – all in service of tightening his grip on power.
Silence and Anticipation: How the Elite Knows What’s Coming
One telling aspect of this march toward full autocracy is the conspicuous silence – or at least measured restraint – of much of Turkey’s elite as these events unfold. Within the halls of power, the boardrooms of big business, and even among segments of the opposition, there is a palpable sense of anticipation. It is as if many key players know what is coming and have resigned themselves to it, or are carefully positioning themselves to survive it. The reaction (or lack thereof) to the İmamoğlu saga speaks volumes. Outside of İmamoğlu’s immediate allies and a segment of opposition voters, there has been no massive elite revolt or unified outcry against the obvious injustices taking place. Influential business figures, who might privately disagree with destabilizing the country’s politics, remain muted, likely calculating that open criticism would jeopardize their enterprises under an increasingly authoritarian regime. Even within Erdoğan’s AKP and its nationalist partners, any dissenting voices are rare to nonexistent – a testament to the climate of fear that has been cultivated.
This silence is not born merely of indifference; it is rooted in self-preservation and foresight. Turkey’s elites have witnessed Erdoğan’s methods before. They remember how, after the 2016 coup attempt, those who even vaguely opposed the government’s narrative were swept aside in purges. They have seen how quickly fortunes can turn when one falls out of favor. As a result, many have chosen to stay quiet or offer only tepid, generalized comments about “stability” and “unity,” rather than explicitly defend someone like İmamoğlu. Within the opposition ranks, there is also a careful calibration. Other prominent figures, such as Ankara’s mayor Mansur Yavaş and other opposition leaders, express support for İmamoğlu and condemn the crackdown, but they tread cautiously. They understand that a larger storm may be coming and that they too could be targets. The collective restraint creates an eerie calm before the storm – a sense that everyone is holding their breath. This elite anticipation essentially smooths the path for Erdoğan’s next moves. By the time the wider crackdown begins, there will be little organized resistance from within the establishment. Whether out of fear or expectation of Erdoğan’s victory in this confrontation, the power centers in Turkey are largely bracing themselves and adapting to a reality where Erdoğan’s will is unchallenged. Their silence, in effect, is an unwitting complicity that enables the transition from a fraught political crisis to a new phase of outright autocracy.
Phase Two: The Wider Crackdown
Annulling İmamoğlu’s diploma alone could have been enough to block his path to the presidency. In addition, multiple criminal investigations are underway against him, many involving requests for political bans. He has already been handed a political ban for allegedly insulting the election board, though that decision is currently under appeal. However, higher courts are likely to uphold the ruling. Erdoğan could also leverage other criminal charges to impose further bans. Still, these legal maneuvers alone may not suffice to consolidate his grip on power. To achieve full autocracy, Erdoğan appears to be preparing—or in need of—a manufactured crisis, one that would justify sweeping crackdowns and allow him to eliminate the last remaining checks on his rule.
With a manufactured crisis in motion and the elite striking a submissive pose, Erdoğan can proceed to Phase Two of his strategy: a broader crackdown that extends well beyond a single opposition figure. The detention of Ekrem İmamoğlu and his associates may only be the beginning of a much wider purge aimed at quashing all potential sources of opposition or dissent. In the pattern of post–July 15, 2016, once a pretext is established, the net can be cast far and wide.
To justify an unprecedented crackdown, Erdoğan may need more than just street protests—he may need blood in the streets, and not just from civilians. Groups like DHKP-C, known for dramatic acts of political violence but with deep suspicions of state infiltration, could be instrumentalized in such a scheme. Staged or allowed attacks on police or government or public properties would create fear and chaos, discredit peaceful protests; and allow Erdoğan to position himself as the only force capable of restoring order.
The ruling party’s control over the judiciary and law enforcement means the legal apparatus can be weaponized to stifle rivals systematically. We can expect to see increasing pressure on other opposition mayors and politicians across the country. For example, officials in cities governed by the CHP or other opposition parties might face sudden investigations, legal charges, or even removal from office under thin pretexts. Already, there are hints that Ankara’s mayor and other outspoken government critics are being scrutinized for any possible misstep. Özgür Özel would also be a clear target: He publicly urged people to take to the streets—a move that Erdoğan’s media and judiciary can easily frame as “incitement to insurrection” or “provoking illegal demonstrations.” Erdogan may even appoint a trustee (“kayyum”) to lead the CHP, claiming the party is involved in illegal activities or “undermining national security.” This could split the CHP, with regime-friendly “moderates” encouraged to break away under a new banner.
This wider crackdown is likely also to target elements of civil society, media, and any remaining independent institutions. Critical journalists and media outlets will face heightened censorship, fines, or closures if they report too aggressively on the İmamoğlu affair or other sensitive issues. We may see social media throttled or activists arrested under expansive anti-terror laws for voicing dissent. Outlets like Halk TV, Sözcü, Tele1, and BirGün can be shuttered by the RTÜK (media regulator) or through Emergency decrees.
Non-governmental organizations that advocate for democracy, human rights, or rule of law could be shuttered or intimidated into inaction. In an autocrat’s playbook, once the most charismatic opposition leader is neutralized, attention turns to erasing the ecosystem that allowed that leader to thrive in the first place. By creating an atmosphere of intimidation and example-making – with İmamoğlu’s fate as a warning – Erdoğan’s regime will discourage anyone else from stepping up as a political challenger.
Importantly, Erdoğan will justify this broad crackdown as a necessary measure to restore order and stability amid the chaos that he himself helped manufacture. If violent protests erupt in response to İmamoğlu’s removal or other grievances, the government can depict them as part of a grand conspiracy to destabilize Turkey – perhaps blaming foreign influences or labeling protesters as extremists. A state of emergency or emergency-like decrees could be reintroduced, legally empowering the president to rule by fiat. Under such conditions, mass arrests and the suppression of rights can be carried out under the banner of national security. By the end of Phase Two, Turkey would effectively be cleansed of meaningful dissent: opposition parties cowed and purged, local governments brought to heel, the media muzzled, and civil society broken. This sets the stage for the final step of Erdoğan’s plan, the ultimate consolidation of power on a personal and familial level.
The Endgame: Dynastic Autocracy
Every action taken in the preceding phases points to a grand endgame: the establishment of a dynastic autocracy in Turkey with the Erdoğan family at its apex. Having tightened his grip on the country through authoritarian means, President Erdoğan’s ambitions seem to extend beyond his own lifetime or legal term limits. The ultimate goal is to entrench his rule in such a way that it can be seamlessly passed down to a chosen successor – namely, his son, Bilal Erdoğan. In effect, Erdoğan is steering Turkey toward a form of governance reminiscent of an absolutist monarchy or a family-run dynasty, albeit under the guise of a republic. This marks a dramatic departure from the republican and democratic traditions of modern Turkey, inching it closer to the example of regimes like those in Syria or Azerbaijan where leadership has become a family inheritance.
The grooming of Bilal Erdoğan as a successor has been a subject of growing discussion and speculation. Although Bilal holds no formal political office, he has been gradually elevated in pro-government circles and business networks. As a businessman and figure involved in influential foundations, he wields behind-the-scenes influence and carries the Erdoğan name into various sectors of society. President Erdoğan’s calculated removal of rivals and consolidation of institutions suggests that he envisions a future where, when the time comes, his son can assume leadership without significant opposition. By eliminating powerful opposition figures like İmamoğlu well in advance, Erdoğan clears the path for a successor who might not have his father’s decades of political experience or popular appeal. In a tightly controlled political landscape, Bilal would not need to be a charismatic vote-winner; the regime’s machinery could ensure his “election” or appointment to high office once his father exits the stage. Furthermore, the reverence that the ruling party’s base has developed for Erdoğan over 20 years in power could be transferred to familial successors through a cultivated personality cult that emphasizes loyalty to the Erdoğan legacy above all.
Transitioning to a dynastic autocracy would likely involve legal and constitutional manipulations as well. Erdoğan might seek to amend laws or even the constitution to allow a smoother succession. For instance, term limits could be removed or adjusted, or new positions could be created that Bilal Erdoğan could first occupy to gain prominence (such as a vice-presidential role or party leadership position) before ultimately taking on the presidency. Additionally, control over the military and security apparatus by trusted Erdoğan family loyalists would be crucial to manage any discontent during a succession. By the time this endgame is reached, Erdoğan aims to have constructed a system where changing the leader does not equate to changing the regime. The regime would effectively be permanent, with the Erdoğan family name enshrined at the top. This dynastic vision underlines why Erdoğan has been willing to undertake such drastic measures; it’s not just about winning the next election, but about cementing a legacy of unbroken power and ensuring that his influence endures through his bloodline.
Conclusion: Crisis as a Tool for Regime Permanence
The trajectory of Turkey’s politics under Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, especially in recent years, reveals a consistent theme: the use of crisis – whether genuine or fabricated – as a mechanism to fortify his regime’s hold on power. From the sweeping purges that followed the July 15, 2016 coup attempt to the current multi-faceted onslaught against Ekrem İmamoğlu, Erdoğan has demonstrated an acute understanding that extraordinary situations can justify extraordinary measures. In each instance, a climate of fear and urgency was cultivated to blur the lines between necessary security actions and authoritarian overreach. By painting opponents as threats to the nation and upheavals as existential crises, Erdoğan secures public tolerance (and even approval from his base) for actions that dismantle democratic norms. The pattern is unmistakable: identify or create a crisis, declare the need to “save the nation,” and then erode the opposition and institutional restraints under that cover.
What sets the current situation apart is its culmination in the audacious goal of dynastic succession. Turkey is witnessing the transformation of its political system into a personalized autocracy, one that Erdoğan intends to make durable beyond his own tenure. In this light, the manufactured political crisis around İmamoğlu is not just about one rival or one election cycle – it is a means to an end, the prelude to an era of open-ended Erdoğan family rule. By removing İmamoğlu and others like him from the chessboard, Erdoğan eliminates any credible alternative leadership that could rally the country in a post-Erdoğan era. He is effectively locking in the gains of his autocracy so that when he hands the reins to his progeny, there is no one left with the strength or legitimacy to contest it. The silent acquiescence of much of the elite and the systematic dismantling of dissent are critical ingredients in this recipe for regime permanence.
In conclusion, Erdoğan’s strategy to establish full autocracy and pave the way for dynastic succession relies fundamentally on crisis as a political tool. It is a high-stakes gambit that is pushing Turkey into uncharted territory. The consequences of this path are profound: the erosion of the republic’s democratic foundations, the subjugation of state and society to one man’s will, and the inception of a ruling dynasty in a country that broke from sultanic rule a century ago. This would mark the completion of Erdoğan’s long-term transformation of Turkey from a flawed democracy into a Putin-style autocracy with dynastic overtones. Whether this strategy ultimately succeeds or encounters unforeseen resistance remains to be seen. What is clear, however, is that Erdoğan has unleashed forces of polarization and authoritarianism that will shape Turkey’s fate for years to come. By turning crisis into opportunity time and again, he has placed Turkey firmly on the road to a permanent regime – one secured through fear, force, and family legacy rather than the free will of the people.
By: News About Turkey (NAT)
