The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) has reported, citing private sources, that leaders of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria — commonly known as Rojava — are weighing a potential strategic shift toward Turkey. This contingency, SOHR notes, hinges on the failure of ongoing political negotiations with the Syrian regime in Damascus.
According to SOHR, if the talks with Damascus fail to yield substantial political gains, the Rojava administration is keeping the possibility of aligning with Ankara open. This could even include acceptance of Turkey’s “National Pact” (Misak-ı Milli) vision.
Some sources cited in the report go further, alleging that Turkey may be actively obstructing a reconciliation between the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Assad regime. The motive, they suggest, is Ankara’s long-term plan to absorb the SDF — or at least a segment of it — as a “potential ally,” thereby disrupting the influence of the other actors in the region while expanding Turkey’s own footprint.
This strategy, according to analysts referenced by SOHR, might intersect with a broader political project: a revival of the peace process between the Turkish state and imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan. The idea is that Turkey could use Öcalan’s symbolic and strategic weight to influence the SDF leadership — many of whom are ideologically aligned with the PKK — and thereby redirect their political compass toward Ankara rather than Damascus or Washington.
Central to Öcalan’s political thought is this thinking: “Turks and Kurds grow together.” This notion, articulated in his prison writings and peace process statements, underscores a vision of coexistence, mutual development, and political partnership. Rather than calling for Kurdish separatism, Öcalan has, since the early 2000s, advocated for a democratic confederalist model — one in which Kurds and Turks share power through decentralized, pluralistic governance.
This idea could offer Erdoğan’s government a unique ideological bridge to the SDF, many of whose leaders were inspired by Öcalan’s ideas. If framed correctly, this approach could allow Ankara to bypass Washington and Damascus by co-opting the political core of the SDF, not through military conquest, but through ideological reorientation.
As we noted in our analyses weeks before the removal of Assad from power, the potential reactivation of Ankara’s dialogue with Abdullah Öcalan is not merely about domestic peace. It could serve a dual function: domestically, to stabilize Kurdish regions inside Turkey; regionally, to create a channel of influence over the SDF and Rojava.
This two-level game — one domestic, one transnational — is not new for Erdoğan. But what is unprecedented is the possibility that Turkey could use Öcalan to legitimize a rapprochement with groups it once labeled as existential threats. That would not only be a political pivot but a signal of Erdoğan’s ambitions to control the post-Assad regional order.
