For now, the KRI is confronted with huge challenges, the major of which are the following:
First is the socioeconomic challenge exacerbated by the fact that wages have been suspended for a few months because of the financial crisis with Baghdad. This is in addition to COVID-19, which hit the region severely.
No less severe is the ongoing rivalry between the two leading parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), or the two extended ruling families – the Barzanis and the Talabanis. This rivalry has deepened not only because of the historical struggle for power between the two but also due to opposite orientation: While the Barzanis are Ankara-oriented, the Talabanis are Tehran- and Baghdad-oriented, something which fueled further the two capitals’ tactics of divide and rule against them.
Another intra-Kurdish challenge is that of the Kurdish–Turkish Kurdistan Worker Party (PKK) which has entrenched its bases inside Iraqi Kurdistan. This presence triggered the establishment of Turkish bases inside the KRI and instigated Turkish army attacks against the PKK, thus jeopardizing the Kurdish region’s security and stability. Iran is another spoiler whose targets include the American bases in the region.
The thorny relations with Baghdad pose the most serious challenge. Even under the amicable Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi, there are ongoing attempts by the central government to incapacitate the Kurdish region by initiating various moves such as overturning the federal system, implementing centralizing policies, halting payments to the region, encouraging Arabizing policies and ignoring the constitution’s articles which call for carrying out a census in the oil-rich disputed areas.
Having said that, Iraq can be described now as a country of two non-state entities, the Arab and the Kurdish ones that are held together by a “balance of weakness”. Still, the Kurdish part appears to be the relatively stronger of the two. Indeed, for all the fluctuations it has experienced, the Kurdish autonomous region has managed to keep a modicum of stability and security in comparison not just to other parts of Iraq but to the Middle East as a whole.
Similarly, for all the rivalry between the KDP and PUK, they do not fight each other and do not pose a challenge to the Kurdish government. This contrasts sharply with the huge number of Shia militias which militate against each other and keep challenging the Iraqi army and the central government in Baghdad. In fact, these militias have emerged as the real decision-makers in Baghdad. Adding further to the insecurity and instability on the Arab side are the ongoing attacks by Daesh, most of which are directed against the central government, the American forces and the Shia militias. With this, the Kurdish region has managed to remain quite safe from them.
Another severe challenge for Arab Iraq are the ongoing demonstrations which started in October 2019 and which reached the level of anarchy, costing the lives of some 700 Iraqis and triggering the change of government, but to no great avail. It is true that in the last few weeks there were some bloody demonstrations in the Kurdish region as well, but again they pale in comparison with those on the Arab side. In short, in terms of governability the Kurdish region is functioning much better than the Arab side.
What does the future hold for Biden’s stance vis-a-vis the KRI? It seems inconceivable that he will encourage or support the establishment of an independent Kurdish state but he may play a crucial role in brokering a fair agreement on outstanding issues between Erbil and Baghdad. The three main issues are the budget, the disputed territories, and the preservation of the constitution.
Based on past American experience in Iraq it is in the interest of the new administration to help solve these problems and see to the entrenchment of a strong and stable Kurdish region for strategic, ideological and economic reasons.
First, the Kurds have remained the most reliable and pro-American partners in a turbulent Iraq as not one American soldier was killed there since 2003.
Second, in terms of ideological posture while extreme Islamism and anti-Americanism is cutting roots in the Arab part of Iraq, the Kurdish region has remained immune to these trends.
Third, the Kurdish region is very rich with oil and gas which may be very beneficial for American enterprise there.
Fourth, if the American forces decide to withdraw from Iraq they might need to relocate to the safer region of Kurdistan.
Fifth, supporting the Kurdish region may send a strong message to both Iran and Turkey, prevent their encroachment into Iraq and weaken the pro-Iranian forces there.
All in all, it remains to be seen whether or not Biden’s goodwill and American interests will withstand the three pronged Iraqi-Iranian-Turkish pressure.
By: Ofra Bengio
The writer is a professor at Tel Aviv University and lecturer at Shalem College, and heads the Dayan Center’s Kurdish studies program. She is the author of four books on the Kurds, the latest of which is Kurdistan’s Moment in the Middle East.
Source: JP
