News About Turkey | NAT

From Erdoğan–Erbakan to İmamoğlu–Kılıçdaroğlu: Is Turkey Facing Another Political Realignment?

In the late 1990s, Turkey’s political map was redrawn by a deep fracture within the Islamist movement. A young and ambitious Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, along with other reformists, broke ranks with Necmettin Erbakan and the rigid doctrines of Milli Görüş (National Vision). Their new party—the Justice and Development Party (AKP- (AKP- Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi)—embraced a more flexible, pro-European, and market-friendly vision. It attracted conservatives disillusioned with old-school Islamism and centrists yearning for change. This pivot wasn’t just cosmetic—it fueled a political upheaval. The AKP's sweeping win in the 2002 elections didn’t just launch Erdoğan’s rise; it effectively buried Turkey’s fractured center-right and birthed a new political era. Fast forward to today, and a different but equally consequential split is brewing—this time inside the main opposition party, the CHP: A court case threatens to annul the 2023 convention results that installed Özgür Özel as party leader—potentially reinstating ex-leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu. After this congress, the party achieved historic success in the 2024 municipal elections—its first nationwide plurality since 1977.  With a court decision expected on June 30, the 2023 congress may be annulled due to alleged procedural irregularities and vote-buying allegations. Kılıçdaroğlu has signalled his intention to reclaim the party leadership through judicial channels—arguing that refusing to comply with a court ruling could lead to the appointment of a state trustee. From prison, Ekrem İmamoğlu has accused Kılıçdaroğlu of betrayal, warning that this power play threatens not just party unity but the broader hope for democratic renewal. “He wants to bury me in concrete,” İmamoğlu reportedly told allies, expressing deep emotional pain at being politically sidelined. His frustration echoes the reformist anguish of Erdoğan in the 1990s, when the old guard refused to yield despite a clear mandate for change. Erdoğan and İmamoğlu: Striking Parallels There are several political, social, and cultural similarities between Erdoğan and İmamoğlu. The parallels become even more striking when considering their shared beginnings as mayors of Istanbul, Turkey’s most influential and symbolically powerful city. Erdoğan held the position from 1994 to 1998, earning national recognition for his pragmatic and effective municipal governance. Two decades later, İmamoğlu followed a similar trajectory, serving from 2019 until his suspension in 2025. For both leaders, the Istanbul mayoralty served as a critical launching pad—providing executive experience and national visibility grounded in tangible service delivery rather than partisan ideology. Erdoğan’s early political success was built on visible urban reforms—cleaning up the Golden Horn, lowering public transit fares, and running social aid campaigns for the needy. İmamoğlu adopted a similar playbook during his tenure as mayor of Istanbul, focusing on inclusive policies that aimed to empower youth and women while addressing the city’s long-standing urban inequalities. One of his signature initiatives was the introduction of affordable municipal dining halls (Kent Lokantaları), which offered low-cost meals to students and low-income residents throughout the city. Like Erdoğan before him, İmamoğlu emphasized practical, people-focused governance—an approach that allowed him to cultivate broad-based grassroots support and build public trust beyond partisan lines. However, when comparing their respective legacies, Erdoğan proved to be a more transformative and politically effective mayor. His tenure not only improved municipal services but also laid the groundwork for his rapid ascent to national leadership—a momentum İmamoğlu has yet to fully replicate. Both Erdoğan and İmamoğlu share cultural and social traits that amplify their populist appeal. Hailing from the Black Sea region—Erdoğan from Rize and İmamoğlu from Trabzon—and with backgrounds as passionate amateur footballers, they have each crafted a relatable, everyman image that resonates with broad segments of the electorate. Beyond cultural familiarity, both have also strategically used religion to bolster their public personas. While Erdoğan integrates religious symbolism into his political identity, İmamoğlu employs a more subtle but deliberate engagement with faith-based communities, positioning himself as respectful of religious values without alienating secular voters. This calibrated use of religion, alongside their shared regional roots and approachable charisma, has helped both men build emotional connections with the public that transcend partisan lines. A striking parallel lies in how legal persecution acted as a political accelerant. Erdoğan’s 1999 imprisonment for publicly reciting a poem turned him into a political martyr, catalyzing his rise to national power. İmamoğlu’s imprisonment and suspension from office in 2025, widely seen as politically motivated, triggered nationwide protests and significantly boosted his national profile. Prior to that, he was sentenced for allegedly insulting members of the election board, a charge that resulted in a political ban—now under appeal. In a further blow, his university diploma was annulled, casting uncertainty over his eligibility for public office. In addition to these developments, İmamoğlu is facing several other criminal investigations, many of which also carry the risk of political bans, reinforcing widespread concerns that legal tools are being weaponized to eliminate him from the political arena.. Yet, the context today differs: whereas Erdoğan rose at a time of growing democratic optimism shaped by European Union (EU) accession talks, press pluralism, and economic expansion, İmamoğlu faces an authoritarian political landscape with a cowed media, co-opted judiciary, and fractured opposition.. The conditions that helped Erdoğan ride a wave to power are far less favorable now. Erdoğan Built the AKP—Could İmamoğlu Build Something New? Necmettin Erbakan, the founder of the Milli Görüş movement, remained committed to a rigid, ideologically driven agenda rooted in political Islam. His refusal to adapt doomed his movement to irrelevance. He alienated Turkey’s reform-minded conservatives with outdated rhetoric and confrontational anti-Westernism. His confrontational approach—especially his attempts to challenge Turkey’s secular order—alarmed the entrenched Kemalist establishment, particularly the military, judiciary, and high bureaucracy. In response, the so-called "postmodern coup" of 1997 forced Erbakan from office, and shortly thereafter, his Welfare Party (Refah Partisi) was banned by the Constitutional Court. This judicial offensive was followed by the banning of its successor, the Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi), in 2001. These moves were not just about outlawing parties—they aimed to fragment and ultimately dissolve the rising political influence of religious conservatives. Ironically, this strategy backfired. The sustained legal and institutional pressure catalyzed a reformist break from Erbakan’s…